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ABSTRACT 
Censored (Tobit) regression is used to estimate the effects of race, location of 
residence, and sex of the household head on formal debt held by South African households. 
The magnitude of the effects suggests that lenders discriminate and that formal financial 
markets could be improved even without technical innovation. 
I. Introduction 
This study uses censored (Tobit) regression to examine discrimination by formal 
lenders in South Africa. Per capita household debt from formal sources is regressed on 
economic variables (proxies for income, assets, and human capital) and non-economic 
variables (race, location of residence, and sex of the household head). The magnitude of 
discrimination is indicated by the estimated effects of the non-economic variables on the 
probability of having positive debt and on the expected amount of debt, if positive. 
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The magnitude of discrimination turns out to be large. For example, a black, rural, 
female-headed household has 29 percentage points less probability of having positive debt and, 
if debt is positive, has R155, 165 less debt on average than a white, metropolitan, male-headed 
household with the same economic status. 1 The importance of non-economic factors suggests 
that, even in the absence of the reduced transactions costs and the improved technical 
efficiency that normally drive the expansion of the frontiers of formal financial markets, the 
frontier of formal finance may also be expanded through the reform of institutions, policies, 
and procedures. 
This paper has three more sections. Following the introduction, section II describes the 
data and the variables. Section III explains the model, the hypothesis, and the test. Section IV 
presents the results and the conclusions. 
1 One dollar was worth about 3.6 Rands in mid-1995. 
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II. Data and Variables 
1. Data 
The data were derived from a national, random survey of 8,848 households conducted 
on the eve of the end of apartheid (Aug.-Dec. 1993) by the South African Labour and 
Development Research Unit at the University of Cape Town.2 The survey was intended to 
measure comprehensively the economic status of households in South Africa. The survey 
covered a plethora of variables, including demographics, expenditures, transfers, assets, 
employment, and education. It also asked for the amount of household debt and for the sources 
of debt. 
2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was taken to be total household debt from formal sources. To 
control for household size, the figure was divided by the number of scaled adult equivalents in 
the household. 3 
Almost 50 percent of South African households have some debt from formal lenders, 
informal lenders, or both. Three considerations drove the choice of formal debt rather than all 
debt as the dependent variable: 
2 The data are in the public domain. The authors thank Simon Mpele and Dudley Horner 
for providing the data. 
3 As in May, Carter, and Posel, the number of scaled adult equivalents was calculated as 
{Adults+ Chilzdren}'·' 
• Results on informal debt have few policy implications because informal debt is 
outside the purview of policy; 
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• Informal debts tend to be smaller and shorter than formal debts and thus demand for 
the two may differ; 
• Discrimination in informal markets is highly unlikely because informal lenders know 
borrowers personally. 
The mean per-capita household debt from formal sources for all households (including 
households with no formal debt) was R4, 149. Median debt was zero, as 70 percent of the 
households had no formal debt. For households with positive debt, the mean was R13,674, 
and the median was Rl ,540. Almost all formal debt, both in amount and in numbers, was for 
housing or for consumer appliances/furniture (Schreiner, Graham, and Coetzee). 
Several aspects of the dependent variable warrant emphasis: 
• It measures only debt, the condition of having acquired a loan and being obligated to 
repay, and not the ability to get loans, also know as credit; 
• It is associated only with households, not individuals; 
• It measures only debt on the day of the interview; 
• It is assumed not to be endogenous with other economic variables of the household; 
• It ignores debt from informal sources; 
• It may include debt from multiple formal sources. 
3. Independent variables 
a. Economic variables 
The data provide an extensive set of measures of the economic status of South African 
households. Income is measured by expenditure, pensions, and net remittances.4 The 
distribution of monthly per-capita expenditure is extremely skewed: the mean is R660, but the 
median is R342. The 27 percent of households with pensions received an average of R216 (per 
4 Households may send and/or receive remittances. 
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capita). These households tended to be rural, black, and among the poorest. Thirty-five 
percent of households reported remittances. 
Assets are measured as the value of agricultural land owned, the number of cattle 
owned, and the value of assets used in productive activities. Less than 1 percent of the 
households owned agricultural land that they had the right to sell. About 7 percent of the 
households owned cattle (median 4 head), and about 11 percent owned assets used in 
productive activities, although the median was only R20. 
Human capital is proxied by the number of literate males and females in the household 
and by the number of males and females in the primary and secondary labor markets. On 
average, households had about 0. 7 members in the primary labor market and 0.28 members in 
the secondary labor market. More males were employed than females. The average household 
had 1.91iterate members and 2.4 illiterate members. 5 
Demographic variables that may affect debt capacity are the age of the household head 
(mean 48 years), the presence of the household head (present in 92 percent of households), 
and having changed residences recently (12 percent had migrated in the past 5 years). 
b. Non-economic variables 
This study focuses o~ three non-economic variables: race, location of residence, and 
sex of the household head. 6 About 75 percent of the households surveyed were black, about 50 
5 As in May, Carter, and Posel, literacy is defined as having passed Standard Four, and 
the number of illiterate members is net of the full-time adult equivalents engaged in fetching 
water and fuel. 
6 Location of residence is both an economic and a non-economic variable. For example, 
different debt capacities may be justified by the different economic opportunities and costs of 
exploiting them faced by otherwise identical rural and urban households. The nature and the 
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percent were rural, and about 25 percent had female heads. It is expected that the households 
that were disadvantaged under apartheid and its bundle of policies--black, rural, and female-
headed households--had fewer debts and smaller debts than would be predicted by economic 
factors alone. 7 
ill. The Model and a Test For Discrimination 
Debt capacity is the amount of debt a household would be able and willing to repay as 
contracted. Demand for loans is less than or equal to debt capacity because a household may 
choose not to indebt itself to its limits. The supply of loans is also assumed not to exceed debt 
capacity. It is reasonable to expect, however, that more debt capacity implies a greater 
demand for loans, as well as a greater supply. 
It is assumed that household preferences do not depend on non-economic variables and 
so a given household's debt capacity and thus its demand for loans are functions only of 
economic variables. Thus, given a level of economic status, debt capacity should not vary with 
non-economic variables such as race, location of residence, and sex of the household head. 
Households with identical economic statuses should, on average, have the same demand for 
loans, regardless of non-economic variables. 
Demand for loans is unobserved; debt is observed. Debt depends on the amount of the 
original loan, which in turn depends on demand and supply. Although both demand and supply 
extent of the differences in opportunities and costs, however, were largely shaped by the geo-
political divisions of apartheid, a non-economic factor. 
7 Until recently, a woman in a customary marriage (that is, a marriage in tribal or 
homeland jurisdictions) was a legal minor in the custody of her husband, and she could not 
enter into written contracts without his permission. 
are functions of the total cost of borrowing/lending and of the economic status of the 
borrower, for a given level of economic status and in the absence of discrimination on the 
basis on non-economic variables, the (unobserved) intersection of the (unobserved) demand 
and supply functions should not vary with a household's non-economic characteristics. 
Furthermore, if preferences and economic status do not vary seasonally nor secularly, 
observed debt will, on average, be half the size of the unobserved original loan. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the relation of observed debt and economic status (Panel A) to 
unobserved demand and supply functions for "poor" (Panel B) and "rich" (Panel C) 
households of different races. The demand curves in Panels B and C depend only on economic 
variables; thus, given an economic status, black and white households share a demand curve. 
The demand curve for "rich" households (Panel C) lies to the right of that of "poor" 
households (Panel B) because demand for loans increases with debt capacity and debt capacity 
increases with economic status. 8 Debt observed is, on average, half the original loan. 
Supply curves may depend on non-economic variables such as race. Suppose lenders 
discriminate by supplying smaller loans for a given total cost and economic status if the 
household is black. Then black households face supply curves farther to the left than do white 
households in Panels Band~. decreasing the amount of the original loan and thus the amount 
of observed debt. 
Given a set of economic and non-economic variables, the econometric model estimates 
the expected amount of debt from formal sources. The estimated change in the expected 
amount of formal debt caused by a change in non-economic variables is illustrated by the 
8 The supply curves are farther right for the same reason. 
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horizontal distance between the two curves in Panel A. In the absence of discrimination, this 
distance would be statistically insignificant. 9 
Censored (Tobit) regression is used because debt is constrained to be non-negative and 
because about 70 percent of the 7, 780 households with non-missing values for the variables 
used in the regression had no debt from formal sources at the time of the survey. In this 
situation, estimates by Ordinary Least Squares are biased and inconsistent. Of course, this 
study focuses less on detecting the presence of discrimination through the statistical 
significance of the estimated regression coefficients themselves and more on measuring the 
extent of discrimination through the estimated magnitudes of the probability of having positive 
debt and of the expected amount of debt held, if positive (McDonald and Moffitt; Greene). 
IV. Results and Conclusions 
Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients and the estimated effects of changes in the 
independent variables on the probability of holding positive debt and on the amount of debt 
9 Formally, let E be a vector of economic variables, NE a vector of non-economic 
variables, and NE' a different vector of non-economic variables. Let status be a function of E 
whose value is a household's economic status, capacity a non-decreasing function of status 
whose value is a household's debt capacity, and demand an increasing function of capacity 
whose value is a household's demand for loans. Let supply in a non-discriminatory market be 
a function only of capacity and thus, via status, of E. In a discriminatory market, supply is 
also a function of NE. If debt is half the value of the intersection of demand and supply given 
E and NE, then the null hypothesis of no discrimination may be expressed as 
debt(E,NE) =debt(E,NE '). 
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held, if positive. 10 Only three of the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from 
zero at the 5 percent level. 11 
Economic variables influence debt as would be expected. Debt increases with income, 
assets, and/or human capital. For example, an increase in household per-capita monthly 
expenditure of Rl increases the likelihood of positive debt by 0.0078 percentage points, and it 
increases the expected amount of debt, if positive, by R42. An extra rand of remittances 
increases debt, and an extra rand of pensions decreases debt, a result explained by the fact that 
most pensioners are poor, elderly, and rural and are unlikely to borrow from formal sources 
in any case. 
Both land and productive assets increase debt, although the magnitudes of the effects 
suggest that land is more valuable as security. Human capital (measured by literacy and by 
employment), age of the household head, presence of the household head, and migration status 
all effect debt in the expected direction and in economically significant magnitudes. 
Non-economic variables also influence debt as hypothesized. Controlling for economic 
status, a black, rural, and/or female-headed household is less likely to have positive debt and 
will have less debt, if positive, on average than a non-black, non-rural, male-headed 
household. In the case of race, a black household is 21 percentage points less likely than a 
10 The marginal effects were calculated for each observation and then averaged over 
observations. As McDonald and Moffitt note, this method is preferred to the usual practice of 
simply evaluating the marginal effects at the sample means of the independent variables. Usual 
practice would be particularly inappropriate in this context because the quasi-continuous 
variables have extremely skewed distributions. 
11 Of course, the estimated marginal effects are themselves random variables with 
distributions. Although standard errors and asymptotic confidence intervals could have been 
calculated with the delta method, this was not done due to the computational burden. 
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white household to have positive formal debt, and the estimated average reduction in the 
amount of debt, if positive, is Rlll ,659. The effects for the other non-black races are similar. 
Compared to male-headed households, female-headed households are 3 percentage 
points less likely to have positive debt and the estimated average reduction in debt, if positive, 
is Rl7 ,608. Finally, compared to non-rural households, rural households are about 5 
percentage points less likely to have positive debt, and the expected reduction in debt, if 
positive, is about R25,000. 
To a first-order approximation, these effects may be aggregated. Thus, a black, rural, 
female-headed household is estimated to be 29 percentage points less likely to have positive 
debt and to have R155, 165 less of debt, if any is held, than a white, metropolitan, male-
headed household. 
The results suggest that household debt from formal sources does depend on non-
economic variables, even after controlling for economic variables and thus debt capacity. This 
is not surprising, given apartheid and its bundle of policies. What is more surprising is the 
degree of discrimination, even on the eve of the end of apartheid. 
It appears that formal lenders in South Africa did not, in the pursuit of profits, 
circumvent the strictures of apartheid to reach disadvantaged households. This analysis cannot 
address whether this resulted from a lack of pursuit due to laziness and/or prejudice, or 
whether it resulted from a lack of profits due to an environment where supplying debt to 
disadvantaged groups was prohibitively costly (including implicit costs caused by pressure 
from the government not to do so). Whatever the reason, it is clear that policy reform in the 
post-apartheid era should be able to increase the ability of disadvantaged groups to acquire 
formal debt. Whether reform should be aimed at lenders, the overall policy environment, or 
both is an issue for further research. 
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Table 1. Results of censored (Tobit) regression on per-capita household debt from formal sources. 
------------
Class of explanatory variable 
Race (default Black) 
Location of residence (default Rural) 
Sex of household head 
Expenditure 
Transfers 
Immovable assets 
Movable assets 
Labor market participation 
Educated labor 
Demographics 
Model parameters 
Log-likelihood: -29,130. 
* Estimate significant at 5 percent. 
** Estimate Sijl;nificant at 1 percent. 
-
Variable (n =7780) 
Coloured 
Indian 
White 
Urban 
·Metro 
Male head 
Expenditure per capita (R) 
Pension per capita (R) 
Net remit. per capita (R) 
V aloe of land owned (R) 
Productive assets (R) 
Cattle (head) 
Males in primary 
Males in secondary 
Females in primary 
Females in secondary 
Net illiterate labor 
Literate labor 
Head present 
Age of head (years) 
Migrated in past five years 
Intercept 
Scale 
Estimated coefficients 
12,450 ** 
13,862 ** 
21,233 ** 
4,409 ** 
4,924 ** 
3,348 ** 
8.0 ** 
-11.3 ** 
8.0 ** 
0.15 ** 
0.0066 * 
-76 
4,213 ** 
-531 
5,408 ** 
2 368 * 
414 * 
1,758 ** 
-247 
-259 ** 
-3,932 ** 
-27,361 ** 
24,588 
Estimated effects of marginal change in 
explanatory variable 
Probability of Amount of debt, 
having some debt given positive 
debt 
0.12 65,472 
0.14 72,900 
0.21 111,659 
0.04 23,187 
0.05 25,898 
0.03 17,608 
0.000078 42 I 
-0.00011 -59 
0.000079 42 I ! 
0.000001 0.8 I 
0.00000006 0.03 
-0.0007 -397 
0.04 22,157 
-0.01 -2,794 
0.05 28,443 
0.02 12,453 
0.004 2,179 
0.02 9,245 
-0.002 -1,301 
-0.003 -1,362 
-0.04 -20,682 
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